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Abstract
The assumption that we are typical observers plays a core role in attempts to make multiverse
theories empirically testable. A widely shared worry about this assumption is that it suffers from
systematic ambiguity concerning the reference class of observers with respect to which typicality
is assumed. As a way out, Srednicki and Hartle recommend that we empirically test typicality
with respect to different candidate reference classes in analogy to how we test physical theories.
Unfortunately, as this paper argues, this idea fails because typicality is not the kind of assumption
that can be subjected to empirical tests. As an alternative, a background information constraint on
observer reference class choice is suggested according to which the observer reference class should
be chosen such that it includes precisely those observers who one could possibly be, given one’s
assumed background information.
1
INTRODUCTION
String theory in combination with eternal inflation suggests that our universe may be one
among many which together form the so-called landscape multiverse [1–3]: a vast collection
of island universes produced by eternal inflation, where conditions differ radically between
island universes, which realize different string vacua and, so, have different effective laws and
parameters. Enhancing the empirical testability of multiverse scenarios such as the land-
scape multiverse—or making them testable in the first place—may be a crucial prerequisite
for further progress in cosmology and high energy physics. The strategy that is widely con-
sidered the most promising is to regard multiverse theories as predicting those observations
that typical observers among those who exist according to these theories will make [4–6].
Following Vilenkin, the term principle of mediocrity is widely used for this assumption.
A serious worry about typicality is that it suffers from a principled ambiguity concern-
ing the observer reference class. (See [7–10] for versions of this worry.) The present paper
considers a response to this worry that derives from the work of Srednicki and Hartle [11]:
that we should empirically test the assumption that we are typical observers with respect to
competing candidate reference classes in analogy to how we test physical theories. Unfortu-
nately, as this paper will argue, typicality with respect to specific reference classes fails to be
the kind of assumption with respect to which the concept of an empirical test makes sense.
However, a non-arbitrary way of singling out a systematically preferred observer reference
class turns out to exist, namely, to include in the reference class precisely those observers
who one possibly could be, given one’s background information D0 and assuming the phys-
ical theory T at issue is correct. The paper concludes by outlining the repercussions of this
background information constraint (BIC) on observer reference class choice with respect to
attempts of accounting for the values of parameters like the cosmological constant using
multiverse theories.
TYPICALITY AND ITS UTILITY IN TESTING MULTIVERSE THEORIES
Typicality principles are used to overcome two severe problems that arise in attempts
to test multiverse theories. The first problem is that any multiverse theory T on its own
makes little to no empirical predictions if the multiverse that it entails is sufficiently vast and
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diverse. There may well exist countless different observers across universes with qualitatively
identical empirical background information as ourselves who are bound to make radically
different observations in their futures [11]. This makes it at least prima facie unclear which
observations such a theory T should be regarded as predicting for our future in view of our
present and past.
The second problem is that we may want to account for (“postdict”) the values of pa-
rameters that we have already measured in our own universe using multiverse theories. But
if according to some multiverse theory T the values of parameters differ wildly between uni-
verses over some wide range, it is again at least prima facie unclear which measured values
we should regard as accounted for by T . For example, according to the landscape multiverse
scenario the value of the cosmological constant varies randomly across island universes. As
famously pointed out by Weinberg [12], only values in some restricted range are compatible
with life, and it is unsurprising that the value that we find lies within that range. But the
landscape multiverse entails the existence of universes with all values in this “anthropically
allowed” range (and many more outside), so it seems unclear for which measured values we
should regard the landscape multiverse as confirmed and for which ones as disconfirmed.
The assumption that we are typical observers can at least in principle help us overcome
both these problems. Typicality straightforwardly follows from self-locating indifference [6],
[23]: the principle that one should assign equal probability to being any specific observer
in some specified observer reference class or, as put by Bostrom’s self-sampling assump-
tion (SSA) [5], that one should reason as if one were randomly sampled from the observer
reference class. Applied to expectations concerning future observations, self-locating indif-
ference recommends that we should expect to observe what most or “typical” observers in
the reference class will observe. With respect to parameters that we have already measured,
typicality advises us to regard cosmological theories T as able to account for precisely those
values that typical reference class members observe if T is true. Virtually all suggested at-
tempts to account for the measured value of the cosmological constant using the landscape
multiverse scenario (e.g. [13, 14]) are based on this idea.
As outlined above, a widely shared worry about typicality is that it suffers from a profound
and unresolvable unclarity concerning observer reference class. This worry can be introduced
and illustrated using an example due to Hartle and Srednicki [9], [24]: imagine that we
have an empirically well-motivated theory TJ which entails that there are hitherto unknown
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intelligent observers in the atmosphere of Jupiter (“Jovians”), in fact are many more Jovians
than there are humans on Earth, i.e. NJ  NH for their numbers; a alternative to TJ we
consider a “null hypothesis” T0 according to which there are no Jovians but only NH humans.
(It is assumed that there are no other candidate observers beside humans and Jovians that
we need to consider.)
The problem of observer reference class choice becomes manifest in the question of
whether we should include the Jovians in the reference class. The answer to this ques-
tion may dramatically impact our preference among TJ and T0. Assume, for the sake of
simplicity, that there are no observers outside our solar system, and suppose that we do
include the Jovians in the reference class. Then, if TJ is true, we are highly atypical ob-
servers in the reference class because most reference class members are Jovians rather than
humans. In contrast, if T0 is true, Jovians do not exist, and the reference class contains only
humans, which makes us typical. Typicality suggests penalizing theories according to which
we are atypical, so, by the assumptions made, it suggests discarding TJ even if our empirical
evidence otherwise happens to be neutral between TJ and T0 or even slightly favors TJ .
The unattractive preference for T0 disappears if we do not include the Jovians in the
reference class. But, assuming that the hypothesized Jovians are sentient and intelligent,
it is unclear on what basis one could justify their exclusion. A well-motivated demarcation
criterion for observer reference class membership is clearly needed.
As pointed out by Garriga and Vilenkin [15], it is possible to avoid the unattractive
systematic preference for T0 over TJ without excluding the Jovians from the reference class by
invoking the controversial self-indication assumption (SIA) [5]. According to the SIA, which
assumes a Bayesian framework of theory assessment, we should assign prior probabilities in
such a way that theories are privileged and/or disfavoured in proportion to the number of
observers whose existence they entail. (The SIA is independently advocated by Olum [16].)
When applied to the humans and Jovians scenario, the SIA precisely cancels the intuitively
implausible systematic preference for T0 over TJ . However, as pointed out by Bostrom and
Cirkovic [17] and acknowledged by Garriga and Vilenkin, the SIA has highly counterintuitive
consequences in other domains, notably the so-called presumptuous philosopher problem ([5],
p. 124). The SIA does in any case not resolve the demarcation problem for observer reference
class membership.
In cosmological practice, relative observer numbers are generally estimated by relying on
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observer proxies such as, for example, relative amount of matter clustered in giant galaxies
[18] or entropy gradient in the causal diamond [13, 19]. The observer reference class problem
manifests itself in the difficulties that arise in the choice of a concrete proxy, which is usually
based on assumptions concerning which observers exist according to the theories under
consideration that qualify for inclusion in the observer reference class. The fact that the
observer reference class problem is relevant to proxy choice underscores how pressing it is:
as pointed out by Starkman and Trotta [20], predictions from multiverse theories for the
cosmological constant depend dramatically on the proxy.
The present paper focuses on an approach to solving the observer reference class problem
that derives from the work of Srednicki and Hartle [11]. Their approach suggests solving
the observer reference class problem by empirically testing typicality with respect to various
candidate reference classes and, in the end, opting for the competitively most successful ref-
erence class. The following section reviews Srednicki and Hartle’s approach, the subsequent
section criticizes it.
SREDNICKI AND HARTLE: THE “ ‘FRAMEWORK’ FRAMEWORK”
As we have seen, typicality is based on self-locating indifference: the assignment of a
uniform probability distribution over observers in the chosen reference class. Following
Srednicki and Hartle, I refer to probabilities ascribed to who one might be among those
in the reference class as first-person probabilities and to probability distributions ξ that
ascribe first-person probabilities as xerographic distributions. If there are N observers in
the reference class, the uniform xerographic distribution, which expresses typicality, is given
by ξind(xi) = 1/N (where the variable xi denotes observers in the reference class and the
index “ind” stands for “indifference”). An example by Bostrom illustrates the appeal of
self-locating indifference:
The world consists of a dungeon that has one hundred cells. In each cell there is
one prisoner. Ninety of the cells are painted blue on the outside and the other
ten are painted red. Each prisoner is asked to guess whether he is in a blue or a
red cell. (Everybody knows all this.) You find yourself in one of the cells. What
color should you think it is?—Answer: Blue, with 90% probability. ([5], p. 59f.)
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The answer P 1p(My cell is blue) = 90% clearly follows from ξind(xi) = 1/100, where i =
1, ..., 100 labels observers by cell number. As pointed out by Bostrom ([5], p. 60f.), the
distribution ξind can be motivated in that it is the only credence function which, when
simultaneously adopted by all prisoners, prevents them from a sure loss in a well-chosen
hypothetical collective bet against them. This motivation, however, does not address the
question of why the observer reference class—encompassing those ascribed non-zero prob-
ability by the xerographic distribution—should be chosen to include precisely all prisoners
rather than only some of them and/or also some non-prisoners (if such exist).
The framework proposed by Srednicki and Hartle in [11] suggests that fundamental phys-
ical theories T be tested alongside xerographic distributions ξ in dyads (T, ξ) called “frame-
works”. (Hence the title of the present section.) Testing frameworks is conveniently modelled
along Bayesian lines (see [21] for a recent systematic defence of using Bayesianism in testing
multiverse theories). The starting point is a prior “third-person”, probability distribution
P (T, ξ) over candidate frameworks (T, ξ). Using Bayes’ theorem, first-person probabilities
P 1p(T, ξ|D0), conditional with respect to our complete background information D0, can be
obtained from the third-person probabilities using Bayes’ theorem (see Eq. 4.1 in [11]):
P 1p(T, ξ|D0) = P
1p(D0|T, ξ)P (T, ξ)∑
(T,ξ) P
1p(D0|T, ξ)P (T, ξ) . (1)
A further crucial assumption by Srednicki and Hartle is that we can treat the fundamental
physical theory T and the xerographic distribution ξ as independent in that the third-person
probability distribution over frameworks (T, ξ) factorizes into a contribution Pth over theories
and a contribution Pxd over xerographic distributions:
P (T, ξ) = Pxd(ξ) · Pth(T ) . (2)
By Eq. (2), we can assess the impact of incoming empirical evidence with respect to Pxd
and Pth separately. Notably, this has the consequence that we can “compete” different
xerographic distributions against each other for the same theory T . Since typicality with
respect to any specific reference classes can be expressed as indifference xind(xi) = 1/N
over the observer reference class, this “competition” promises an empirical solution to the
observer reference class problem with the victorious reference class selected as the one to be
used in future empirical tests of multiverse (and other cosmological) theories.
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CRITICIZING THE “ ‘FRAMEWORK’ FRAMEWORK”
The xerographic distribution ξ(xi) is itself a probability distribution, so the probabili-
ties ascribed to xerographic distributions by Pxd(ξ) are second-order. There is no difficulty
in principle with second-order probabilities. For example, hypotheses Hθ concerning the
unknown bias θ of some (presumably biased) coin can be individuated in terms of their
probability ascriptions to the various possible sequences of outcomes. Accordingly, proba-
bilities P (Hθ) defined over such hypotheses concerning coin bias are second-order. They are
obviously well-defined and can be tested by repeated coin tossing and evaluating the toss
outcomes.
However, there is an important difference between hypothesesHθ concerning coin bias and
xerographic distributions ξ: while there supposedly exists some actual—perhaps unknown—
bias θ of the coin (defined in terms of long-term outcome frequencies), so that precisely one
Hθ is true, there is no “true” xerographic distribution ξ, except in the uninteresting and
trivial sense in which each observer xj has this role played by their characteristic function
χj(xi) = δi,j.
This fundamental difference between hypotheses concerning unknown coin biases and
xerographic distributions becomes relevant when it comes to updating procedures with re-
spect to ξ and Hθ, respectively. Whereas the evidential impact of data concerning coin toss
outcomes on probability assignments over the hypotheses Hθ can be conveniently modelled
by Bayesian updating of P (Hθ), it turns out that the impact of self-locating information is
adequately modelled only by updating the xerographic distribution ξ itself rather than by
updating any probability distribution Pxd(ξ) over xerographic distributions.
To see this, consider again Bostrom’s dungeon, which hosts 90 prisoners in blue cells and
10 prisoners in red cells. Suppose that a prisoner somehow finds out that she is in a blue
cell. According to the approach suggested by Srednicki and Hartle, her rational posterior
first-person probability P>,1p(ξ) after finding this out, which is given by her conditional
first-person prior probability P 1p(ξ|My cell is blue), evaluated at fixed theory T for which
Pth(T ) = 1, is obtained from Eq. (1) as
P 1p(ξ|My cell is blue) = P
1p(My cell is blue|ξ)Pxd(ξ)
P 1p(My cell is blue)
. (3)
Now suppose that the prior Pxd(ξ) over xerographic distributions ascribes a non-zero proba-
bility to at least one xerographic distribution ξ0 that has non-vanishing support in both blue
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and red cells. For example, suppose that the prior Pxd(ξind) assigned to ξind(xi) = 1/100 is
non-zero (possibly 1).
By assumption, ξ0 ascribes non-zero probability to being in a blue cell, i.e.
P 1p(My cell is blue|ξ0) is non-zero. By Eq. (3), P 1p(ξ0|My cell is blue) must be non-zero
as well. This is problematic, however: by assumption, ξ0 ascribes non-zero probability to
being an observer in a red cell, and this conflicts with one’s determinate knowledge that
one’s cell colour is blue. Updating in accordance with Eq. (3) thus leads to an awkward
situation where one is, on the one hand, completely certain that one is in a blue cell while
simultaneously entertaining the possibility that one is in a red cell [25].
The problem is not confined to simple examples like Bostrom’s dungeon but appears
in applications of Srednicki and Hartle’s framework to actual cosmological problems. For
example, assume that we want to account for the observed value of the cosmological con-
stant Λ and assign a prior Pxd(ξ) that is non-zero (perhaps 1) for the uniform xerographic
distribution ξind over observers who witness the full anthropically allowed range ∆Λ across
universes. Having measured Λ in our own universe and finding it within some finite proper
subrange δΛ ⊂ ∆Λ, the posterior first-person probability P>,1p(ξind) = P 1p(ξind|Λ ∈ δΛ)
assigned to ξind is non-zero by Bayes’ theorem because ξind is non-zero over the members of
δΛ. Assigning a non-zero posterior to ξind in that situation is incoherent, however, because
ξind ascribes non-zero probability to Λ lying in ∆λ but outside δΛ, contrary to our knowledge
from measurements of Λ according to which Λ ∈ δΛ.
The adequate procedure for taking into account the impact of self-locating information
like “My cell is blue” or “I’m in a universe with Λ ∈ δΛ” does not seem to be Bayesian
updating of any second-order probability distribution Pxd(ξ). A much simpler and better
option is to directly update some prior xerographic distribution ξprior itself. (If there are
various candidate priors ξk between which it is difficult to decide, one can use a weighted
average ξ =
∑
k wkξk, where the wk can be chosen such as to correspond as the Pxd(ξk) in
Srednicki and Hartle’s scheme.)
This option immediately delivers the intuitively correct and plausible verdict for the
applications discussed. For example, if in Bostrom’s dungeon a prisoner starts with the
uniform prior ξind(xi) = 1/100 over all prisoners, ordinary Bayesian conditioning with respect
to “My cell is blue” yields the attractive posterior ξ>(xi) = ξind(xi|My cell is blue) given by
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the conditional prior
ξind(xi|My cell is blue) = ξind(My cell is blue|xi) · ξind(xi)
ξind(My cell is blue)
=

1·1/100
9/10
if xi is a blue− cell observer
0·1/100
9/10
otherwise
=
1/90 if xi is a blue− cell observer0 otherwise . (4)
In this updating scheme, unlike in the one that derives from the framework proposed by
Srednicki and Hartle, typicality as encoded in ξind is not empirically “tested” in that it is
not treated as a hypothesis in analogy to some theory T that one treats as confirmed or
disconfirmed by evidence. Prima facie it seems to be used as a primitive starting point for
which no further justification is given. Having abandoned the idea of solving the observer
reference class problem by testing typicality with respect to candidate reference classes we
will see in the following section how paying attention to one’s background information D0
allows one to choose the reference class in a non-arbitrary way.
THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONSTRAINT IN REFERENCE CLASS
CHOICE
Garriga and Vilenkin suggest that the observer reference class problem can be solved by
including in the reference class precisely those observers with “identical information content”
as oneself [15]. According to them, in other words, given an observer’s full (first- and third-
person) background information (“information content”) D0, the appropriate reference class
to use is the one that contains precisely those whose background information is D0.
This suggestion is helpful but delivers overly restrictive verdicts in some applications.
Consider again Bostrom’s dungeon scenario: one would expect that prisoners in different
cells differ in memories and/or current states of knowledge, but this will not per se make it
irrational for them to assign the uniform distribution ξ(xi) = 1/100 over prisoners. What
would make it irrational is if their background information D0 allowed them to rule out
being some of the 100 prisoners. This simple idea is encoded in the following background
information constraint (“BIC”) on the observer reference class, which the present paper
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suggests as a general principle of observer reference class choice in anthropic reasoning:
(BIC) Given background information D0, include in the observer reference class
precisely those observers who you possibly could be in view of D0.
Typicality is only attractive if the background information D0 is evidentially neutral with
respect to who one might be among those who one possibly could be, given D0. If this
neutrality constraint is not fulfilled, a non-uniform xerographic distribution should be used
in place of the uniform one, still based on the background information constraint BIC. In
what follows it will be assumed that the neutrality constraint is fulfilled.
Who among all observers that exist according to some theory T at issue one could possibly
be, given one’s background information D0, depends in general on the theory T . Different
fundamental theories T1 and T2 will usually differ on which observers exist and on how many
of them one could possibly be, given that D0 is one’s background information. Accordingly,
xerographic distributions associated with T1 and T2 will in general differ as well. We must
therefore assign an index for the theory T to the xerographic distribution, so that it becomes
ξT (xi|D0).
By the definition of conditional probability, the first-person probability P 1p(T, xi|D0) can
be written in product form as
P 1p(T, xi|D0) = P 1p(xi|T,D0) · P 1p(T |D0) , (5)
which replaces Srednicki and Hartle’s factorization assumption Eq. (2).
The first factor on the right hand side of Eq. (5) specifies the probability of being xi,
assuming T ’s truth and one’s background information D0. This makes it plainly equivalent
with the xerographic distribution ξT (xi|D0), which also specifies the probability of being xi,
given D0, if T holds. The second factor on the right hand side of Eq. (5) applies only to
the “third-person” fact of which theory T holds. One can identify it with the third-person
probability distribution Pth(T |D0) over theories. In virtue of these identities Eq. (5) becomes
P 1p(T, xi|D0) = ξT (xi|D0) · Pth(T |D0) . (6)
The following section illustrates how BIC, using Eq. (6), solves the observer reference class
problem by applying it to the humans and Jovians scenario.
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HUMANS AND JOVIANS AGAIN
Let us recapitulate why we should expect that there are likely no Jovians if we include the
Jovians in our observer reference class. The indifference-expressing xerographic distribution
in this case is ξTJ ,ind(xi|D0) = 1/(NJ+NH) for TJ and ξT0,ind(xi|D0) = 1/NH for T0, whereNJ
is the number of Jovians according to TJ and NH the (known) number of humans according
to both TJ and T0.
From Eq. (6) we obtain the ratio of the first-person probabilities P 1p(TJ , I am human|D0)
and P 1p(T0, I am human|D0) as
P 1p(TJ , I am human|D0)
P 1p(T0, I am human|D0) =
NH
NJ +NH
· Pth(TJ |D0)
Pth(T0|D0) . (7)
By assumption, NH/(NJ + NH)  1 because NH  NJ . As a consequence, unless the
third-person probabilities Pth(TJ |D0) and Pth(T0|D0) happen to strongly favor TJ over T0,
the first-person probabilities P 1p(TJ |D0, I am human) and P 1p(T0|D0, I am human) turn out
to strongly favor T0 over TJ . Taking into account the datum that we are humans thus
supports the null hypothesis T0 according to which there are no Jovians over the alternative
hypothesis TJ according to which there are Jovians.
But should we include the Jovians in the observer reference class according to BIC? To
answer this question we need to determine whether we possibly could be Jovians, given our
background information D0. Now, our actual background information D0, which includes
all (scientific and everyday) data that we currently happen to have, plainly includes the fact
that we are human and live on Earth. Plausibly, it not only rules out that we are Jovians but
even specifies precisely who we are among humans, identifying each of us in terms of name,
date of birth, place of birth etc. Our actual background information thus effectively narrows
down who we are to some specific human observer xj. So, using our actual background
information as D0 we obtain from Eq. (6)
P 1p(TJ , I am human|D0)
P 1p(T0, I am human|D0) =
Pth(TJ |D0)
Pth(T0|D0) , (8)
which yields no preference in first-person probabilities for T0 over TJ when taking into
account one’s being human.
But perhaps we should consider operating on the basis of background information D0
which does not include the fact that we are human. Indeed, it seems natural to abstract from
data whose impact we are trying to assess—in this case, that we are human—and consider
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that impact based on background information D0 that does not include these data. And if
some hypothetical amount of background information D0 has been obtained by abstracting
from our being human, it may well be compatible with its bearer being Jovian. Then
BIC would dictate using a reference class that indeed does have Jovians as members. For
such background information D0 the argument centred around Eq. (7) can be run and the
systematic preference for T0 apparently vindicated.
However, while abstracting from bits of our actual background information to arrive at a
suitable D0 is in principle possible, the actual, practical outcome of this abstraction process
seems highly dubious and unclear. We may ask ourselves, for example, whether hypothetical
background information D0 that is compatible with us being Jovians should plausibly include
data gathered at particle accelerators built and operated by us humans and, if some, which
of those data. The answer to this question has the potential to matter a lot with respect to
who exactly will end up included in the reference class.
Moreover, since any candidate D0 arrived at by abstracting from the fact that we are
human is so radically impoverished with respect to our actual background information,
it is difficult to estimate which third-person probability assignments Pth(TJ |D0) would be
rational to assign. Our ordinary plausibility verdicts are probably no reliable guide if the
hypothesized background information D0 differs so massively from our actual state of knowl-
edge. But unless we have a prima facie reasonable case for assigning values Pth(TJ |D0) and
Pth(T0|D0) of specific orders of magnitude, we have, in the light of Eq. (6), no strong case for
first-person probabilities P 1p(TJ |B, I am human) and P 1p(T0|B, I am human) that strongly
favor T0 over TJ . To conclude, BIC solves the observer reference class problem in such a
way that, when applied to the humans and Jovians scenario, there appears to be no robust
case for any unattractive systematic preference of T0 over TJ .
ACCOUNTING FOR MEASURED PARAMETERS USING MULTIVERSE THEO-
RIES
Which background information D0 and, derivatively, which reference class of observers
should we choose in attempts to account for the measured values of fundamental parameters
in terms of multiverse theories? The most obvious choice would be our full actual background
information and, correspondingly, the reference class of all observers who we possibly could
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be, given our actual background information and the theory T that we happen to consider.
However, if we want to account for the value of some already measured parameter, this is not
an option because it would prevent us from treating that value as a non-trivial prediction of
T . For example, if we want to account for the measured value of the cosmological constant
using the landscape multiverse scenario, we must use a reference class of observers who find
different values for that constant and then determine whether the value that we find is a
typical one among those found by observers in that reference class.
There is probably no single best recipe for singling out any specific proper part D0 of our
actual background information as ideally suited for this task. The following two desiderata,
however, seem reasonable to request and may serve as rough guidelines:
• First, it should be practically feasible to determine unambiguously which and how
many observers one could possibly be, given the chosen background information D0,
for all theories T that one wishes to test.
• Second, it should be practically possible to reasonably motivate one’s assigned third-
person probabilities Pth(T |D0) for the chosen D0 and all theories T that one wishes
to test.
Figuring out which observers exist according to some given multiverse theory T and how
many of them one could possibly be, given some chosen background information D0, is
in general a Gargantuan challenge. Typically, it will require predicting and understanding
complex and emergent phenomena in universes that have radically different effective (higher-
level) physical laws and parameters than our own. But despite these difficulties, accepting
the challenge is without alternatives, notably if one wishes to check the quality of observer
proxies and, derivatively, the predictions based on them. Thus, even though the rule BIC in
principle allows to uniquely identify the appropriate observer reference class to be used in
applications of typicality, testing concrete multiverse theories on its basis will likely remain
an arduous task.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Work on this article was supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Re-
search (NWO), Veni grant 275-20-065.
13
∗ s.m.friederich@rug.nl
[1] R. Bousso and J. Polchinski, J. High Energy Phys. 06, 006 (2000).
[2] S. Kachru, R. Kallosh, A. Linde, and S. P. Trivedi, Phys, Rev. D 68, 046005 (2003).
[3] L. Susskind, The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design
(New York: Back Bay Books, 2005).
[4] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846 (1995).
[5] N. Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy (New
York: Routledge, 2002).
[6] A. Elga, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 383 (2004).
[7] A. Aguirre and M. Tegmark, J. Cosm. and Astrop. Phys. 501, 003 (2005).
[8] S. Weinstein, Class. and Quantum Grav. 23, 4231 (2006).
[9] J. B. Hartle and M. Srednicki, Phys. Rev. D 75, 123523 (2007).
[10] F. Azhar, Class. Quantum Gravity 31, 035005 (2014).
[11] M. Srednicki and J. B. Hartle, Phys. Rev. D 81, 123524 (2010).
[12] S. Weinberg, Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 2607 (1987).
[13] R. Bousso, R. Harnik, G. D. Kribs, and G. Perez, Phys. Rev. D 76, 043513 (2007).
[14] A. De Simone, A. H. Guth, M. P. Salem, and A. Vilenkin, Physical Review D 78, 063520
(2008).
[15] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 77, 043526 (2008).
[16] K. Olum, The Philosophical Quarterly 52, 164 (2002).
[17] N. Bostrom and M. M. C´irkovic´, The Philosophical Quarterly 53, 83 (2003).
[18] H. Martel, P. R. Shapiro, and S. Weinberg, Astrophys. Journal 492, 29 (1998).
[19] R. Bousso, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 191302 (2006).
[20] G. D. Starkman and R. Trotta, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 201301 (2006).
[21] L. A. Barnes, in The Philosophy of Cosmology, edited by K. Chamcham, J. Barrow, S. Saun-
ders, and J. Silk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) p. 447.
[22] S. Carroll, From Eternity to Here (New York and London: Plume, 2010).
[23] The term self-identifying indifference would fit better, but self-locating indifference is already
widely used, so I stick to this terminology here.
14
[24] See ([22], p. 225), for an analogous example which posits intelligent lizard beings on a planet
orbiting Tau Ceti rather than Jovians and [8], Sect. 2.2, for an example featuring humans and
“aliens”.
[25] No analogous difficulty arises with respect to hypotheses Hθ concerning coin toss bias. Here
the posterior P+(Hθ) = P (Hθ|D), where D are outcome data concerning observed tosses, is
given by
P (Hθ|D) = P (D|Hθ)P (Hθ)
P (D)
This is unproblematic because being certain aboutD is not in tension with assigning a non-zero
(posterior) probability to Hθ. Whether Hθ obtains concerns the limiting long-run frequency
behaviour of the coin, assumed to be a determinate matter, which is not in any possible
conflict with the outcome data D.
15
